A clandestine cell system
is a method for organizing a group of people such as resistance fighters,
sleeper agents, or terrorists so that such people can more effectively resist
penetration by an opposing organization (such as law enforcement).
In a cell structure, each of the small group of people in the cell only know the identities of the people in their cell. Thus, a cell member who is apprehended and interrogated (or who is a mole) will not likely know the identities of the higher-ranking individuals in the organization.
The structure of a clandestine cell system can range from a strict hierarchy to an extremely distributed organization, depending on the group's ideology, its operational area, the communications technologies available, and the nature of the mission.
This sort of organizational structure is also used by criminal organizations, undercover operations, and unconventional warfare units led by special forces.
Covert and clandestine operations are not the same when it comes to tradecraft. The modern NATO definition of a covert operation says the identity of the sponsor is concealed, but in a clandestine operation the operation itself is concealed from the participants. Put differently, clandestine means "hidden", and covert means "deniable" — that is to say that the sponsor of a covert action is sufficiently removed from it that the sponsor can claim ignorance in the event the plot is discovered.
A sleeper cell refers to a cell, or isolated grouping of sleeper agents, that lies dormant until it receives orders or decides to act.
World War II French Resistance
In World War II, Operation Jedburgh teams parachuted into occupiedFrance
Especially through the French member, they would contact trusted individuals in the area of operation, and ask them to recruit a team of trusted subordinates (a subcell). If the mission was sabotage, reconnaissance, or espionage, there was no need to meet in large units. If the team was to carry out direct action (often an unwise mission unless an appreciable number of the locals had military experience) it would be necessary to assemble into larger units for combat. Even then, the hideouts of the leadership were known only to subcell leaders. The legitimacy of the Jedburgh team came from its known affiliation with Allied powers, and it was a structure more appropriate for unconventional warfare than for truly clandestine operations.[
Also known as the Viet Cong, this organization grew from earlier anti-colonial groups fighting the French and from anti-Japanese guerrillas during World War II. Its command, control, and communication techniques derived from the experiences of these earlier insurgent groups. The group had extensive support fromNorth Vietnam , and, indirectly, from the Soviet Union . It had parallel political and military structures,
often overlapping.
The lowest level consisted of three-person cells who operated quite closely, and engaged in the sort of self-criticism common, as a bonding method, to Communist organizations.
Provisional Irish Republican Army
The modern Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) has a history going back to Irish revolutionary forces in the early 20th century. It has little external control. Its doctrine and organization have changed over time, as political, technological, and cultural situations have changed inIreland
Officially, the PIRA was hierarchical, but as British security forces became more effective it changed to a semiautonomous model for its operational and for certain of its support cells (such as transportation, intelligence, cover, and security). Its leadership saw itself as guiding and as building consensus. The lowest-level cells, typically of 2–5 people, tended to be built from people with existing personal relationships. British counterinsurgents could understand the command structure, but not the workings of the operational cells.
The IRA had an extensive network of inactive or sleeper cells, so it could summon new ad hoc organizations for any specific operation.
The NLF (Viet Cong) and PIRA, as well as other movements, have chosen to have parallel political and military organizations. In the case of the NLF, except for some individuals with sanctuary inNorth Vietnam
In the case of the PIRA, its political wing, Sinn Féin, became increasingly overt, and then a full participant in politics. Hamas and Hezbollah also have variants of overt political/social service and covert military wings.
The overt political/social–covert military split avoided the inflexibility of a completely secret organization. Once an active insurgency began, the secrecy could limit freedom of action, distort information about goals and ideals, and restrict communication within the insurgency. In such a split organization, public issues can be addressed overtly while military actions are kept covert and intelligence functions stay clandestine.
Many cell systems receive support from outside the cell. This can include leaders, trainers, and supplies (such as the Jedburgh assistance to the French Resistance), or a safe haven for overt activities (such as the NLF spokesmen who could operate inHanoi
External support need not be overt. Certain Shi'a groups inIraq ,
for example, receive assistance from Iran ,
but this is not a public position of the government of Iran U.S. support to the Afghan Northern Alliance U.S.
Note that both unconventional warfare (guerrilla operations) and foreign internal defense (counterinsurgency) may be covert and use cellular organization.
In a covert counterinsurgency mission, only selected host nation leaders are aware of the foreign support organization. Under Operation White Star, for example,U.S.
Different kinds of insurgency differ in where they place clandestine or covert cells. Also, when certain types of insurgency grow in power, they deemphasize the cell system. They may still use cells for leadership security, but if overt violence by organized units becomes significant, cells become less important. In Mao's three-stage doctrine, cells are still useful in Phase II to give cover to part-time guerillas, but as the insurgency creates full-time military units in Phase III, the main units become the focus, not the cells.
Different varieties of insurgency place their cells differently with respect to the existing government. The U.S. Army Field Manual FM3-07 distinguishes between varieties of insurgencies. Drawing on this work, Nyberg (a United States Marine Corps officer) describes four types of cell system (there is also a new type associated with transnational terrorist insurgencies):
If the al-Qaeda Training Manua is authentic, it demonstrates that Eastern cell structures may differ from the Western mode. Al-Qaida's minimal core leadership group can be viewed as a ring or chain network, with each leader/node heading their own particular hierarchy.
Such networks function by having their sub-networks provide information and other forms of support (the ‘many-to-one’ model), while the core group supplies ‘truth’ and decisions/directions (the ‘one-to-many’ model). Trust and personal relationships are an essential part of the Al-Qaida network (a limiting factor, even while it provides enhanced security). Cell members are trained as ‘replaceable’ units and ‘vetting’ of members occurs during the training period under the observation of the core group.
Cells of this structure are built outwards, from an internal leadership core. Superficially, this might be likened to a Western cell structure that emanates from a headquarters, but the Western centrality is bureaucratic, while structures in other non-Western cultures build on close personal relationships, often built over years, perhaps involving family or other in-group linkages. Such in-groups are thus extremely hard to infiltrate. Still, it may be possible for an in-group to be compromised through COMINT or, in rare cases, by compromising a member.
The core group is a ring, superimposed on an inner hub-and-spoke structure of ideological authority. Each member of the core forms another hub and spoke system, the spokes leading to infrastructure cells under the supervision of the core group member, and possibly to operational groups that the headquarters supports. In an organization like this, there is a point at which the operational cell becomes autonomous of the core. Members surviving the operation may rejoin at various points.
Osama bin Laden, in this model, had the responsibility of commanding the organization and being the spokesman on propaganda messages distributed by the propaganda cell. The other members of the core each command one or more infrastructure cells.
While the tight coupling enhances security, it can limit flexibility and the ability to scale the organization. The in-group values that tie the cell together initially, shared cultural and ideological values, are not sufficient to create additional loyalty to a bureaucratic process.
"Members of the core group are under what could be termed 'positive control'—long relationships and similar mindsets make 'control' not so much of an issue, but there are distinct roles, and position (structural, financial, spiritual) determines authority, thus making the core group a hierarchy topologically."
In the illustration of the core shown here, each member knows how to reach two other members, and also knows the member(s) he or she considers her or his ideological superior. Solid lines show basic communication, dotted red arrows show the first level of ideological respect, and dotted blue arrows show a second level of ideological respect.
If Osama, the most respected, died, the core would reconstitute itself. While different members each have an individual ideological guide, and these are not the same for all members, the core would reconstitute itself with (in our example) Richard as most respected.
Assume there are no losses, and Osama can be reached directly only by members of the core group. Members of outer cells and support systems might know him only as "the Commander", or, as in the actual case of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden's face is recognizable worldwide, but only a few people knew where he was or even how to contact him.
In a cell structure, each of the small group of people in the cell only know the identities of the people in their cell. Thus, a cell member who is apprehended and interrogated (or who is a mole) will not likely know the identities of the higher-ranking individuals in the organization.
The structure of a clandestine cell system can range from a strict hierarchy to an extremely distributed organization, depending on the group's ideology, its operational area, the communications technologies available, and the nature of the mission.
This sort of organizational structure is also used by criminal organizations, undercover operations, and unconventional warfare units led by special forces.
Covert Operations versus
Clandestine Operations
Covert and clandestine operations are not the same when it comes to tradecraft. The modern NATO definition of a covert operation says the identity of the sponsor is concealed, but in a clandestine operation the operation itself is concealed from the participants. Put differently, clandestine means "hidden", and covert means "deniable" — that is to say that the sponsor of a covert action is sufficiently removed from it that the sponsor can claim ignorance in the event the plot is discovered.
A sleeper cell refers to a cell, or isolated grouping of sleeper agents, that lies dormant until it receives orders or decides to act.
Examples from History
World War II French Resistance
In World War II, Operation Jedburgh teams parachuted into occupied
Especially through the French member, they would contact trusted individuals in the area of operation, and ask them to recruit a team of trusted subordinates (a subcell). If the mission was sabotage, reconnaissance, or espionage, there was no need to meet in large units. If the team was to carry out direct action (often an unwise mission unless an appreciable number of the locals had military experience) it would be necessary to assemble into larger units for combat. Even then, the hideouts of the leadership were known only to subcell leaders. The legitimacy of the Jedburgh team came from its known affiliation with Allied powers, and it was a structure more appropriate for unconventional warfare than for truly clandestine operations.[
National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
Also known as the Viet Cong, this organization grew from earlier anti-colonial groups fighting the French and from anti-Japanese guerrillas during World War II. Its command, control, and communication techniques derived from the experiences of these earlier insurgent groups. The group had extensive support from
The lowest level consisted of three-person cells who operated quite closely, and engaged in the sort of self-criticism common, as a bonding method, to Communist organizations.
Provisional Irish Republican Army
The modern Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) has a history going back to Irish revolutionary forces in the early 20th century. It has little external control. Its doctrine and organization have changed over time, as political, technological, and cultural situations have changed in
Officially, the PIRA was hierarchical, but as British security forces became more effective it changed to a semiautonomous model for its operational and for certain of its support cells (such as transportation, intelligence, cover, and security). Its leadership saw itself as guiding and as building consensus. The lowest-level cells, typically of 2–5 people, tended to be built from people with existing personal relationships. British counterinsurgents could understand the command structure, but not the workings of the operational cells.
The IRA had an extensive network of inactive or sleeper cells, so it could summon new ad hoc organizations for any specific operation.
Parallel
Organizations
The NLF (Viet Cong) and PIRA, as well as other movements, have chosen to have parallel political and military organizations. In the case of the NLF, except for some individuals with sanctuary in
In the case of the PIRA, its political wing, Sinn Féin, became increasingly overt, and then a full participant in politics. Hamas and Hezbollah also have variants of overt political/social service and covert military wings.
The overt political/social–covert military split avoided the inflexibility of a completely secret organization. Once an active insurgency began, the secrecy could limit freedom of action, distort information about goals and ideals, and restrict communication within the insurgency. In such a split organization, public issues can be addressed overtly while military actions are kept covert and intelligence functions stay clandestine.
External Support
Many cell systems receive support from outside the cell. This can include leaders, trainers, and supplies (such as the Jedburgh assistance to the French Resistance), or a safe haven for overt activities (such as the NLF spokesmen who could operate in
External support need not be overt. Certain Shi'a groups in
Note that both unconventional warfare (guerrilla operations) and foreign internal defense (counterinsurgency) may be covert and use cellular organization.
In a covert counterinsurgency mission, only selected host nation leaders are aware of the foreign support organization. Under Operation White Star, for example,
Models of Insurgency
and Associated Cell Characteristics
Different kinds of insurgency differ in where they place clandestine or covert cells. Also, when certain types of insurgency grow in power, they deemphasize the cell system. They may still use cells for leadership security, but if overt violence by organized units becomes significant, cells become less important. In Mao's three-stage doctrine, cells are still useful in Phase II to give cover to part-time guerillas, but as the insurgency creates full-time military units in Phase III, the main units become the focus, not the cells.
Different varieties of insurgency place their cells differently with respect to the existing government. The U.S. Army Field Manual FM3-07 distinguishes between varieties of insurgencies. Drawing on this work, Nyberg (a United States Marine Corps officer) describes four types of cell system (there is also a new type associated with transnational terrorist insurgencies):
- Traditional: The slowest to form, these are typically
indigenous insurgencies that begin with limited goals. These are more
secure than others, as they tend to form from people with preexisting
social, cultural, or family ties. The insurgents resent a government that
has failed to recognize tribal, racial, religious, or linguistic groups.
They "perceive that the government has denied their rights and
interests and work to establish or restore them. They seldom seek to
overthrow the government or control the whole society; however, they
frequently attempt to withdraw from government control through autonomy or
semiautonomy." The Mujahideen in
- Subversive: These are usually driven by an organization
that contains at least some of the governing elite, some being
sympathizers already in government, and others who penetrate the
government. When they use violence, it has a specific purpose, such as
coercing voters, intimidating officials, and disrupting and discrediting
the government. Typically, there is a political arm (such as Sinn Féin or
the National Liberation Front) that directs the military in planning
carefully coordinated violence. "Employment of violence is designed
to show the system to be incompetent and to provoke the government to an
excessively violent response which further undermines its
legitimacy." The Nazi rise to power, in the 1930s, is another example
of subversion. Nazi members of parliament and street fighters were hardly
clandestine, but the overall plan of the Nazi leadership to gain control
of the nation was hidden. "A subversive insurgency is suited to a
more permissive political environment which allows the insurgents to use
both legal and illegal methods to accomplish their goals. Effective
government resistance may convert this to a critical-cell model.
- Critical-cell: These come into play when the political
climate becomes less permissive than one that allowed shadow cells. While other
cell systems try to form intelligence cells within the government, this
type sets up "shadow government" cells that can seize power once
the status quo is overthrown. This model includes the classic coup d'etat,
and often tries to minimize violence. Examples include the Sandinista
takeover of an existing government weakened by external popular
revolution. "Insurgents also seek to infiltrate the government's
institutions, but their object is to destroy the system from within."
Clandestine cells form inside the government. "The use of violence
remains covert until the government is so weakened that the insurgency's
superior organization seizes power, supported by the armed force. One
variation of this pattern is when the insurgent leadership permits the
popular revolution to destroy the existing government, then emerges to
direct the formation of a new government. Another variation is seen in the
Cuban revolution and is referred to as the foco (or Cuban model)
insurgency. This model involves a single, armed cell which emerges in the
midst of degenerating government legitimacy and becomes the nucleus around
which mass popular support rallies. The insurgents use this support to
establish control and erect new institutions."
- Mass-oriented: While the subversive and covert-cell systems work
from within the government, the mass-oriented system builds a government
completely outside the existing one, with the intention of replacing it.
Such "insurgents patiently construct a base of passive and active
political supporters, while simultaneously building a large armed element
of guerrilla and regular forces. They plan a protracted campaign of
increasing violence to destroy the government and its institutions from
the outside. They have a well-developed ideology and carefully determine
their objectives. They are highly organized and effectively use propaganda
and guerrilla action to mobilize forces for a direct political and
military challenge to the government." The revolution that produced
the People's Republic of
Non-Traditional Models,
exemplified by al-Qaeda
If the al-Qaeda Training Manua is authentic, it demonstrates that Eastern cell structures may differ from the Western mode. Al-Qaida's minimal core leadership group can be viewed as a ring or chain network, with each leader/node heading their own particular hierarchy.
Such networks function by having their sub-networks provide information and other forms of support (the ‘many-to-one’ model), while the core group supplies ‘truth’ and decisions/directions (the ‘one-to-many’ model). Trust and personal relationships are an essential part of the Al-Qaida network (a limiting factor, even while it provides enhanced security). Cell members are trained as ‘replaceable’ units and ‘vetting’ of members occurs during the training period under the observation of the core group.
Cells of this structure are built outwards, from an internal leadership core. Superficially, this might be likened to a Western cell structure that emanates from a headquarters, but the Western centrality is bureaucratic, while structures in other non-Western cultures build on close personal relationships, often built over years, perhaps involving family or other in-group linkages. Such in-groups are thus extremely hard to infiltrate. Still, it may be possible for an in-group to be compromised through COMINT or, in rare cases, by compromising a member.
The core group is a ring, superimposed on an inner hub-and-spoke structure of ideological authority. Each member of the core forms another hub and spoke system, the spokes leading to infrastructure cells under the supervision of the core group member, and possibly to operational groups that the headquarters supports. In an organization like this, there is a point at which the operational cell becomes autonomous of the core. Members surviving the operation may rejoin at various points.
Osama bin Laden, in this model, had the responsibility of commanding the organization and being the spokesman on propaganda messages distributed by the propaganda cell. The other members of the core each command one or more infrastructure cells.
While the tight coupling enhances security, it can limit flexibility and the ability to scale the organization. The in-group values that tie the cell together initially, shared cultural and ideological values, are not sufficient to create additional loyalty to a bureaucratic process.
"Members of the core group are under what could be termed 'positive control'—long relationships and similar mindsets make 'control' not so much of an issue, but there are distinct roles, and position (structural, financial, spiritual) determines authority, thus making the core group a hierarchy topologically."
In the illustration of the core shown here, each member knows how to reach two other members, and also knows the member(s) he or she considers her or his ideological superior. Solid lines show basic communication, dotted red arrows show the first level of ideological respect, and dotted blue arrows show a second level of ideological respect.
If Osama, the most respected, died, the core would reconstitute itself. While different members each have an individual ideological guide, and these are not the same for all members, the core would reconstitute itself with (in our example) Richard as most respected.
Assume there are no losses, and Osama can be reached directly only by members of the core group. Members of outer cells and support systems might know him only as "the Commander", or, as in the actual case of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden's face is recognizable worldwide, but only a few people knew where he was or even how to contact him.
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