The 1982 British military campaign to recapture the Falkland Islands depended on complex logistical arrangements. The logistical difficulties of operating 7,000 nautical miles (8,100 mi; 13,000 km) from home were formidable. The Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands came at a time when the Royal Navy's amphibious capability was being run down; but it still possessed the aircraft carriers HMS Hermes and Invincible, the landing platform dock (LPD) ships HMS Fearless and Intrepid, and six landing ship logistics (LSL) ships. To provide the necessary logistic support, the Royal Navy's ships were augmented by ships taken up from trade (STUFT).
The British Army and Royal Navy
developed a base at Ascension Island, a British territory in the mid-Atlantic
3,700 nautical miles (4,300 mi; 6,900 km) from the UK and 3,300
nautical miles (3,800 mi; 6,100 km) from the Falkland Islands.
Although it had an airfield with an excellent runway, there was only a small hardstand
area for parking aircraft and no parallel taxiways. There was an anchorage, but
no port facilities—just a lone jetty. Ascension was used as a convenient place
for the amphibious ships to re-stow their equipment, and as a base for Hercules
transport aircraft, which were modified by the addition of auxiliary fuel tanks
and aerial refueling probes. With the support of Victor tankers, these
modifications allowed the transports to deliver priority supplies to the South
Atlantic.
The 3rd Commando Brigade landed at Ajax
Bay, Port San Carlos and San Carlos on East Falkland, but struggled to build up
its supplies as the Argentine air forces made repeated attacks on ships in
Falkland Sound. SS Atlantic Conveyorwas
struck by two Exocet AM39 missiles, and sank with three Chinook and six Wessex helicopters
still on board, along with their tools and spare parts, and other vital stores
including tent accommodation. The loss of the helicopters on Atlantic
Conveyor was a serious blow; it forced the 3rd Commando Brigade to
make a loaded march across East Falkland. The Brigade Maintenance Area (BMA)
was struck by an Argentine air attack on 27 May that destroyed hundreds of
rounds of mortar and artillery ammunition. Forward Brigade Maintenance Areas
(FBMAs) were established at Teal Inlet for the 3rd Commando Brigade and Fitzroy
for the 5th Infantry Brigade. Some 500
rounds per gun were delivered to gun positions by helicopters to enable the artillery
to support the attacks on the mountains ringing Port Stanley. The successful conclusion of these battles resulted
in the surrender of the Argentine forces in the Falklands on 14 June.
Background of the Conflict
Tensions between Britain and Argentina
over the disputed Falkland Islands (Malvinas) rose swiftly after Argentine
scrap metal merchants and Argentina Marines raised the Argentine flag over South
Georgia Island on 19 March 1982, and on 2 April, Argentine forces occupied the
Falkland Islands. The British government
had already taken some action on 29 March, ordering the submarines HMS Spartan
and HMS Splendid to sail for the South Atlantic. Spartan left Gibraltar on 1 April, and
Splendid sailed from Faslane the same day. A third submarine, HMS Conqueror,
followed on 4 April.
The Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) stores
ship RFA Fort Austin was despatched from the Western Mediterranean to
replenish the only British warship in the South Atlantic, the patrol vessel HMS
Endurance, which was down to its last three weeks' supplies. The tanker RFA
Appleleaf, which had left Curaçao bound for the United Kingdom with a
full load of fuel, received orders on 27 March to divert to Gibraltar, embark
stores there, and join Endurance and Fort Austin in
the South Atlantic.
When intelligence was received in London
on 31 March that the Falklands would be invaded on 2 April, the Prime Minister,
Margaret Thatcher, and the Secretary of State for Defence, John Nott, instructed
the First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Leach, to ready a force to
recapture the islands. The Commander-in-Chief
Fleet, Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, who was based at Northwood Headquarters,
was placed in command of Task Force 317, with overall responsibility for this
operation, codenamed Operation Corporate.
Air Marshal Sir John Curtiss was appointed air component commander, and
Major General Jeremy Moore, land component commander.
Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward, Flag
Officer First Flotilla, commanded the aircraft carrier battle group (TG 317.8);
Commodore Michael Clapp, the Commodor, Amphibious Warfare, commanded the
amphibious force (TG 317.0); and Brigadier Julian Thompson, the landing force
(TG 317.1). Thompson's force was built
around his 3rd Commando Brigade, which had three battalions of the Royal
Marines (40 Commando, 42 Commando and 45 Commando), and supporting units
including its own logistic support unit, the Commando Logistic Regiment. About
80 per cent of the Commando Logistic Regiment's men were Royal Marines; the
rest came from the British Army and Royal Navy.
Aftermath of the Falklands War
Lieutenant Colonel Leslie Kennedy
arrived at San Carlos soon after the Argentine surrender as Commander Royal
Engineers (CRE) Works, Falkland Islands. His task was to rehabilitate Port
Stanley. It took the sappers of 9 Parachute Squadron and 61 Field Squadron four
days to restore the water supply to Port Stanley. By this time, the reservoirs
were down to two days' supply. In the meantime it was supplied by Fort
Toronto through a dracone moored offshore. A military water supply
point at Moody Brook was constructed and operated by 3 Field Squadron. The
town's consumption was about 12,000 imperial gallons (55,000 l) per day.
The electric grid had also been damaged by shellfire, and took a week longer to
repair. Its capacity was still limited, so it was supplemented by two 250 KW
Army generators. A separate military power station was subsequently
established. Fuel was supplied using a dracone.
The major task was restoration of the
port and airfield. In the interim, the Hercules transports continued to fly
from Ascension, dropping high priority items.
The postal unit moved from Ajax Bay into the Post Office at Port
Stanley. At first, mail bags were
airdropped but some fell into Argentine minefields. A method was then devised
to allow the Hercules to deliver bags without having to land by trailing a
grappling hook attached to the bags which snagged a wire strung between two
poles.
Built in the 1970s, the airfield had a
4,100-by-150-foot (1,250 by 46 m) runway. It was unusable because it had
been cratered by the RAF. Its rehabilitation was undertaken by 11 Field
Squadron and 59 Independent Commando Squadron.
The Argentinians had already repaired three craters. The others were
filled in and topped with Argentine aluminium matting. A huge crater caused by
a 1,000-pound (450 kg) bomb required over 1,000 square metres (11,000 sq ft)
of matting. "Scabs", or scrapes in the runway surface, of which there
were several hundred, were repaired with Bostik 276, a magnesium phosphate
cement and aggregate mixture. There were 47 Hercules and several hundred
Harrier landings before the airfield was closed for repairs on 15 August.
The runway was too short for use by the
RAF's Phantoms, so 50 Field Squadron (which had been detailed for the task in
May) began extending it to 6,100 feet (1,900 m). Some 9,000 long tons
(9,100 t) of airfield construction stores, plant and equipment were landed
for this purpose. 25,000 long tons (25,000 t) of quartz granite rock fill
was used, which was obtained by 3 and 60 Field Squadrons from a local quarry.
Aluminium matting was laid along the whole length of the runway. The first
Hercules landed on the new runway on 28 August.
Subsequently, RAF Mount Pleasant was built as a permanent airbase, and
opened by Prince Andrew on 12 May 1985.
Sites for the breakdown and storage of
bulk supplies were limited, and the warehouses were initially used for the
Argentine prisoners. While Port Stanley
provided anchorages for deep draft vessels, its berths were only 6 to 10 metres
(20 to 33 ft) deep, suitable only for shallow draft vessels. The Royal
Engineers built two slipways for mexeflotes and LCUs. As late as April 1983, the Ministry of
Defence had 25 ships on charter to supply the Falkland Islands. About 1,000
personnel were being ferried to and from the islands each month, requiring the
services of Uganda and
Cunard Countess. To provide a
regular service, a ferry, the SS St Edmund was taken up and
commissioned as a troopship, HMS Keren. The port was replaced by a £23 million
floating wharf and warehouse complex that opened on 26 April 1984. This
consisted of six 800-foot (240 m) North Sea oil rig support barges that
were linked together. Atop them were warehouses, refrigerated storages, and
accommodation and mess facilities for 200 people. It could berth vessels up to
1,000 feet (300 m) long, and was connected to the shore by a 623-foot (190
m) two-lane causeway. An access road was constructed by 37 Engineer Regiment.
With the end of hostilities in the
Falklands (although Operation Keyhole, the reoccupation of Thule Island in the South
Sandwich Islands, remained, and was concluded on 20 June), the British forces
became responsible for feeding the civilian population and 11,848 Argentine
prisoners. Due to the British blockade of the island, they had only three days'
rations. The prisoners were initially issued with Argentine rations, but the British
withheld the officer rations as they contained alcohol. Prisoners rioted on 16
June, setting fire to their clothing store. Those taken at Goose Green had
already been repatriated to Argentina via Montevideo in neutral Uruguay on Norland.
Some 5,000 Argentine prisoners were embarked on Canberra and 1,000 on Norland
on 17 June. By 20 June 10,250 prisoners had been repatriated. Only 593
remained, including Menéndez. These were held for intelligence gathering, and
to encourage Argentina to end hostilities. One British prisoner, Flight
Lieutenant Jeffrey Glover, was held in Argentina; he was released on 16 July.
The last Argentine prisoners were repatriated by 14 July.
The Bakery Section of 91 Ordnance
Company baked its first loaf in the Falkland Islands on 30 June. It baked up to
6,000 loaves per day before settling down to just 4,000 by August. Although rations could soon be supplemented
with fresh fruit and vegetables, it was not until August that the troops could
be fed fresh rations.
Lessons Learned from the Falklands War
In the logistics section of its report
to Parliament on the lessons of the war, the Ministry of Defence highlighted
the prodigious expenditure of ammunition and missiles; the high level of logistic
support required for operations outside western Europe; the importance of civil
resources in the defence effort; and the utility of aerial refuelling. The value of the Royal Navy's amphibious
forces was reassessed. A replacement for the lost Sir Galahad was
ordered, and two roll-on roll-off ferries, RFA Sir Caradoc and Sir
Lamorak, were chartered while the new RFA Sir Galahad was built and Sir
Tristram was repaired. However, the government still dithered over the
replacement of the Fearless-class LPDs; and replacements, the Albion class,
were not ordered until 1996. The oil rig
support ship MV Stena Inspector was purchased in 1983, and became RFA Diligence,
while Astronomer and Contender Bezant were retained as RFA Reliant
and Argus respectively. The value of STUFT was recognised, and over
the next few years STUFT would see active service in the Mediterranean, the Red
Sea and the Persian Gulf.
The Falkland War was also studied in
other countries, notably in China, where it was the subject of organised
teaching and research at the PLA Naval Command College in Nanjing. The Americans were impressed by the speed
with which the British were able to mobilise their forces and get them moving
to the theatre of operations in response to a crisis that had erupted with very
little warning. A programme was already
under way to improve American sealift capability, and between 1982 and 1986,
the United States Congress appropriated and spent US$7 billion on the purchase
or lease of new logistics ships. They would be tested in the 1991 Gulf War. Thompson felt that the overriding importance
of logistics as the driving factor of operations was overlooked. He was
particularly disappointed that the 5th Infantry Brigade had not used the time
it had before embarkation to remedy more of its logistical shortcomings.
Logistics lessons drawn from the
conflict were not new, but had not been learned either. These included the
failure to integrate operational and tactical planning; improper tactical
loading of ships; outdated planning data for consumables, particularly fuel and
ammunition; lack of heavy-lift helicopters and poor discipline in the
employment of helicopters; shortages of land transport; the employment of new
and highly complex equipment on the battlefield; faulty casualty evacuation
plans; and the need for post-conflict planning.
British and American commentators observed that much of this could be
traced to logistically unrealistic peacetime training and exercises, and called
for more exercises where there were "no permanent quarters to house the
troops, no Federal Express to deliver critical supply parts, no power production
and no in-place hookups for communications or intelligence information."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_logistics_in_the_Falklands_War
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