A ruling of nonjusticiability will ultimately prohibit the issue that is bringing the case before the court from being able to be heard in a court of law. In the typical case where there is a finding of nonjusticiability due to the political question doctrine, the issue presented before the court is usually so specific that the Constitution gives all power to one of the coordinate political branches, or at the opposite end of the spectrum, the issue presented is so vague that the United States Constitution does not even consider it. A court can only decide issues based on law. The Constitution dictates the different legal responsibilities of each respective branch of government. If there is an issue where the court does not have the Constitution as a guide, there are no legal criteria to use. When there are no specific constitutional duties involved, the issue is to be decided through the democratic process. The court will not engage in political disputes.
A constitutional dispute that requires knowledge of a non-legal character or the use of techniques not suitable for a court or explicitly assigned by the Constitution to the U.S. Congress, or the President of the
The doctrine has its roots in the historic Supreme Court case of Marbury v. Madison (1803). In that case, Chief Justice John Marshall drew a distinction between two different functions of the U.S. Secretary of State.
The doctrine is grounded in the federal judiciary's desire to avoid inserting itself into conflicts between branches of the federal government. It is justified by the notion that there exist some questions best resolved through the political process, voters approving or correcting the challenged action by voting for or against those involved in the decision.
The leading Supreme Court case in the area of political question doctrine is Baker v. Carr (1962). In the opinion written for Baker, the Court outlined six characteristics of a political question. These include:
- A "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or"
- A "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or"
- The "impossibility for a court's independent resolution without expressing a lack of respect for a coordinate branch of the government; or"
- The "impossibility of deciding the issue without an initial policy decision, which is beyond the discretion of the court; or"
- An "unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or"
- The "potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question."
While this is a still rather unsettled doctrine, its application has been settled in a few decided areas. These areas are:
Foreign affairs and the power to make warA court will not usually decide if a treaty has been terminated, because on that issue, "governmental action… must be regarded as of controlling importance."
- Given the sensitive problems of holding a war to be illegal, most issues relating to the constitutionality of a war may well be nonjusticiable.
The Guarantee Clause
The Court has treated the Guarantee Clause as not a repository of "judicially manageable standards which a court could utilize independently in order to identify a State's lawful government."
Article I, section 2 of the Constitution states that the House "shall have the sole power of Impeachment", and Article I, section 3 provides that the "Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments." Since the Constitution placed the sole power of impeachment in two political bodies, it is qualified as a political question.
GerrymanderingIn the case of Davis v. Bandemer (1986), the Supreme Court held that gerrymandering cases were justiciable under the equal protection clause. The precedential power of this case is still unclear; to date, the Court still struggles to determine what the standard of review in gerrymandering cases should be.
- Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004) held claims of partisan gerrymandering nonjusticiable because a discernible and manageable standard for adjudicating them had not been established or applied since Davis v. Bandemer. Justice Breyer, who dissented, wrote in his most recent book that if he could change three of his dissenting opinions (while on the Supreme Court) into a majority, this would be one of them.